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I Comments I
Swatting a Bug Without a Flyswatter:
Minimizing the Impact of Disease Control




In his famous essay On Liberty, philosopher John Stuart Mill
questions: "How much of human life should be assigned to
individuality, and how much to society?"' Mill's attempt to balance
individual liberty2 and social order is not a novel concept, 3 especially in
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2007; B.A. English/Pre-law, summa cum laude, Indiana University of
Pennsylvania, The Robert E. Cooks Honors College, 2004.
1. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY Part IV, 1 (1869).
2. This term is used generically to mean the choice, or the ability to exercise
freedoms bestowed upon the individual by the laws of his or her respective country.
3. See Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (deciding that in the interest of public
health, a man could be forcefully subjected to a smallpox vaccination against his will):
There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject to the
common good. On any other basis organized society could not exist with
safety to its members. Society based on a rule that each one is a law unto
himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for
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the realm of public health law.4  In recent decades, however,
globalization has magnified the challenge for international health
governance to effectively safeguard individual liberty. The movement of
people and goods across national borders has produced a heightened
threat of the importation of infectious diseases, 5 which has likewise
increased the potential for human rights violations in implementing
public health measures to contain these diseases.
Moreover, public health regulation significantly affects human
rights in several ways, including: surveillance (privacy); vaccination and
treatment (bodily integrity); travel restrictions (movement); and isolation
and quarantine (liberty).6 The list of human rights public health
governance implicates is not exhaustive.7 This is precisely why the
challenge is for public health measures to be tailored in such a way as to
anticipate, account for, and ultimately minimize prospective intrusions
on individual liberty.
The 2005 revision of the World Health Organization's (WHO)
all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right
of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect to his person or
property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.
Id. at 26.
4. Legal systems and international human rights permit governments to infringe on
individual liberty in the interest of protecting public health. See U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4/Annex,
(1985), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/siracusaprinciples.html (last
visited Jan. 10, 2006) [hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
No state party shall, even in time of emergency threatening the life of the
nation, derogate from the Covenant's guarantees of the right to life; freedom
from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and from
medical or scientific experimentation without free consent; freedom from
slavery or involuntary servitude; the right not to be imprisoned for contractual
debt; the right not to be convicted or sentenced to a heavier penalty by virtue of
retroactive criminal legislation; the right to recognition as a person before the
law; and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. These rights are not
derogable under any conditions even for the asserted purpose of preserving the
life of the nation.
Id. at Part 1I.D, 58.
5. See MAX HARDIMAN ET AL., GLOBAL CRISES, GLOBAL SOLUTIONS: MANAGING
PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN THROUGH THE REVISED
INTERNATIONAL HEALTH REGULATIONS 1 (2002), available at http://www.who.int/csr/
resources/publications/ihr/WHOCDSCSRGAR_2002 4 EN/en/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2007) (contending that few public health risks solely implicate national concerns).
6. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, World Health Law: Toward a New Conception of
Global Health Governance for the 2 1s Century, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS
413, 423 (2005) [hereinafter New Conception].
7. "Infectious disease control implicates the rights to life, liberty and security of
person, privacy, health, an adequate standard of living, food, housing, education,
development .. " DAVID P. FIDLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE 169
(1999).
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International Health Regulations8 (IHR) is the only global regulation for
the control of infectious diseases. 9 It endeavors to modernize public
health governance by providing a framework to assess and control an
international public health event. 10 Because the international traveler is
an important figure in the scheme of effective disease control, the
protection of individual liberty remains a persistent concern for many
countries." This Comment compares the human rights safeguards for
travelers under the IHR 196912 with the safeguards proposed under the
IHR 2005 to determine their practical limitations and to make
recommendations for improvement.
The next four parts of this Comment provide a basis for
understanding the background and substance of the IHR 1969. Part II
examines the history of international disease control leading up to the
adoption of the IHR 1969. Part III focuses on the revisions of the IHR
1969, specifically highlighting the inadequacies of the current
Regulations and comparing the major changes implemented in the IHR
2005. Part IV discusses the legal capacity of the proposed Regulations.
Part V compares and evaluates human rights safeguards under both sets
of Regulations concerning health measures, treatment of personal data
and baggage, and charges. The conclusion evaluates the IHR 2005's
human rights safeguards and recommends improvement for these
protections.
II. Historical Background of the IHR
The origin of the IHR dates back to the cholera epidemics in Europe
from 1830 to 1847.13 The first International Sanitary Conference, held in
8. The International Health Regulations refer collectively to two international
instruments of the World Health Organization: the current International Health
Regulations (1969) and the revised International Health Regulations (2005). The IHR
2005 will replace the IHR 1969 when they become effective in June 2007. For a
discussion of the adoption of IHR 2005, see infra Parts III.B and IV.A.
9. HARDIMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 3.
10. An "event" is the "manifestation of disease or an occurrence that creates a
potential for disease." World Health Assembly, Revision of the International Health
Regulations, WHA Res. 58.3, at Part I, art. 1, 58th Ass., 8th plen. mtg. (May 23, 2005),
available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA58/WHA58_3-en.pdf (last
visited Jan. 10, 2007) [hereinafter IHR 2005].
11. Not all WHO Member States prioritize the protection of human rights. For a
complete list of the 193 WHO Member States, see World Health Organization,
Countries, available at http://www.who.int/countries/en/index.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2007) [hereinafter WHO Member States].
12. World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (1969), 3d ed.
1983, available at http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/current/en/index.html (last visited Jan. 10,
2007) [hereinafter IHR 1969].
13. See World Health Organization, Frequently Asked Questions about the
International Health Regulations, http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/howtheywork/faq/en/
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Paris in 1851, addressed the international effects of infectious diseases.
14
Very few of the proposed conventions were adopted. 15 In 1903, the
adopted conventions were replaced by a new International Sanitary
Convention. 16
It was not until the turn of the Twentieth Century that the United
States became involved in the international effort to control the spread of
infectious diseases. In 1902, United States delegates met in Washington,
D.C., and established the International Sanitary Bureau (ISB).' 7  The
European States followed in 1907 by developing their own health
institution, L'Office International d'Hygi6ne Publique (OIHP)."8 In
1923, the Health Organization of the League of Nations (HOLN) was
formed and vowed to "take steps in matters of international concern for
the prevention and control of disease."' 9
The ISB, OIHP, and HOLN were separate entities that functioned
independently and enforced regulations within their limited area of
control.20 Consequently, these institutions did virtually nothing toward
coordinating global public health efforts. 21 The founding of the United
Nations (U.N.) in 1945 brought harmony to disjointed international
health governance by identifying the protection of global public health as
one of its objectives. To fulfill that mandate, the U.N. established the
WHO. 3
The WHO Constitution became enforceable against Member States
in 1948.24 In 1951, the World Health Assembly (WHA), the WHO's
index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2007) [hereinafter WHO FAQ].
14. Id.
15. But see HARDiMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 1 (recognizing that the International
Sanitary Convention dealing with cholera was adopted in Venice in 1892, and another
convention dealing with plague was adopted in 1897).
16. Id. at2.
17. This organization eventually became the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau
(PASB), which was a precursor to the Pan- American Health Organization (PAHO). Id.
18. The name of this institution translates into "International Bureau of Public
Health." Id.
19. League of Nations Covenant art. XXIII, f.
20. HARDIMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
21. See id.
22. See U.N. Charter art. 55, b (stating that because "conditions of stability and
well-being are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations" the U.N. shall promote
"higher standards of living" and "solutions of international economic, social, health and
related problems"), available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2007).
23. The objective of the WHO is "the attainment by all peoples of the highest
possible level of health." CONST. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, art. 1,
available at http://www.who.int/about/en/ (follow "WHO Constitution" hyperlink) (last
visited Jan. 10, 2007) [hereinafter WHO CONST.].
24. All countries that are members of the U.N. may become Member States by
accepting the WHO Constitution. Other countries can be admitted by a majority vote of
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governing body, adopted25 the International Sanitary Regulations (ISR).26
The ISR were renamed the International Health Regulations in 1969.27
Although they were slightly modified in 1973 and again in 1981,28 the
IHR remain substantially the same as when they were first adopted half a
century ago.
1II. Revision of the IHR
A. The Reasons for Revision
Being that they are the first major changes to the Regulations in
over thirty years, the revisions to the IHR 1969 aim to be more
responsive to the problems spawned by disease transmission in an
increasingly globalized society. In fact, the WHA's 2005 adoption of the
proposed Regulations came only months before several recent disease
outbreaks. 29  Avian influenza raged through Vietnam and Thailand
during 2004 and 2005, 30 and in September 2005, the polio virus was
discovered among Amish children living in Minnesota.31
1. Limited Coverage
Initially, the IHR applied to only six public health concerns:
cholera, plague, relapsing fever, 32 smallpox, typhus, and yellow fever.
33
the World Health Assembly. See id. at arts. 4, 6.
25. The WHA has the authority to adopt conventions, promulgate regulations, and
make recommendations. Id. at arts. 19, 21, 23.
26. The ISR are described as "the end product of the intensive infectious disease
diplomacy by countries in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries." HARDIMAN
ET AL., supra note 5, at 2.
27. Id.
28. The latter modification excluded smallpox, which had been globally eradicated.
See Global Smallpox Eradication, WHA Res. 33.4, World Health Assembly, 33rd Ass.
(May 8, 1980).
29. The diseases discussed in this paragraph are only the most recent public health
scares. For a more thorough discussion of earlier disease outbreaks that prompted the
revision of the IHR 1969, see infra Part III.A. 1.
30. See World Health Organization, Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases
of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO, Jan. 9, 2007, http://www.who.int/csr/
disease/avianinfluenza/country/cases-table_2007_01_09/en/index. html (last visited Jan.
10, 2007) [hereinafter Avian Influenza Deaths].
31. This was the first outbreak of polio in the United States since 1979. The virus
was discovered on September 29, 2005, in an eight-month-old girl, and was subsequently
confirmed in four other Amish children. See Gardiner Harris, 5 Cases of Polio in Amish
Group Raise New Fears, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, at Al.
32. Relapsing fever is one of several diseases that are caused by a tick bite. See
WebMD, Tick Bites: Topic Overview, http://www.webmd.com/hw/skin-wounds/
hw87788.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
33. WHO FAQ, supra note 13.
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After the IHR 1969 were modified, their scope was limited to cholera,
plague and yellow fever.34 Therefore, the IHR 1969 do not account for
new public health threats 35 that arose since the ISR's adoption in 1951.
As evidence of the problematic nature of the IHR 1969's limited disease
coverage, it is estimated that approximately thirty new infectious agents
have been identified in the last three decades.
36
The need for updated coverage was prompted by the international
outbreak of new infectious diseases. Ebola hemorrhagic fever devastated
Yambuku, Zaire, and other parts of Africa starting in 1976.37 The United
States also had a short-lived scare in 1989 after the Ebola virus appeared
in a monkey quarantine facility in Reston, Virginia.38 The outbreak of
SARS in China drew worldwide attention in 2003. 39 Avian influenza,
although less devastating than Ebola or SARS,4 ° is the most recent threat
to emerge. Bioterrorism also remains a concern in the wake of the
September 11 th attacks.41
In contrast to the disease coverage of IHR 1969, the IHR 2005
contain provisions for dealing with existing, new, and reemerging
42diseases, including diseases caused by non-infectious agents. This is an
important revision because it broadens the scope of international disease
control beyond those disease outbreaks that are immediately foreseeable
or predictable.
34. Id.
35. Reasons for these emergent threats include: changes in the way food is
processed, encroachment on unexplored areas of the world, and the increase in cross-
border travel. See Rob Stein, SARS Prompts WHO to Seek More Power to Fight Disease;
Proposals Include Visits to Nations Threatened by an Epidemic, WASH. POST, May 18,
2003, at A10.
36. See WHO Takes Key Steps to Combat Emerging Diseases, PR NEWSWIRE U.S.,
Sept. 21, 2005 [hereinafter Steps to Combat Emerging Diseases].
37. The mortality rate of the Zaire strain of Ebola was approximately 90%. See
LAURIE GARRET, THE COMING PLAGUE: NEWLY EMERGING DISEASES IN A WORLD OUT OF
BALANCE 100-52 (1995) for a comprehensive discussion on the devastating spread of
Ebola in Zaire.
38. See Richard Preston, The Hot Zone: A Terrifying True Story (1995).
39. For a list of all countries that have reported probable cases of SARS, see World
Health Organization, Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1
November 2002 to 31 July 2003, http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table20040421/
en/index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2006) [hereinafter SARS Deaths].
40. Compare id. (the number of SARS-related deaths stands at 774) with World
Health Organization, Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever Fact Sheet, http://www.who.int/
mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/index.html (the number of deaths from Ebola is over
1200) (last visited Jan. 10, 2007), and Avian Influenza Deaths, supra note 30 (the number
of reported deaths from the A/(H5N1) strain of avian influenza currently stands at 157).
41. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, City Weighs Plan to Deliver Medicine to Public After
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2005, at B 1.
42. See WHO FAQ, supra note 13.
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2. Notification Dependence
The current IHR are completely dependent on Member States to
notify the WHO of a disease outbreak.43 Notification is limited to the
three covered diseases: cholera, plague and yellow fever.4  Not
surprisingly, the WHO's reliance on Member States' notification caused
complications; diseases would spread before the agency could institute or
recommend containment measures. For instance, the Chinese
government did not confirm a SARS epidemic existed until several
months after it began,45 when SARS had already caused widespread
devastation. 6
By contrast, the proposed IHR endow the WHO with greater control
over disease management by expanding Member States' notification
requirements. Under the new IHR, the WHO provides detailed criteria
that Member States must use in order to determine whether an event
constitutes a public health emergency of international concern.47 Such an
event requires mandatory reporting and must be brought to the WHO's
attention "by the most efficient means of communication available. 48
The WHO also requires mandatory reporting for an enumerated list of
"unusual and unexpected" diseases, 49 and recommends careful scrutiny
in evaluating the need for notification of other diseases "which have
demonstrated the ability to cause serious public health impact and to
spread rapidly internationally.,
50
3. Weak Collaborative Mechanisms
The IHR 1969 lack mechanisms to facilitate communication
between Member States and the WHO when a public health threat is
43. See IHR 1969, supra note 12, at Part II.
44. "Each health administration shall notify [the WHO]... within twenty-four hours
of its being informed that the first case of a disease subject to the Regulations ... has
occurred in its territory." Id. at Part II, art. 3.
45. See Stein, supra note 35.
46. Of the 774 total probable deaths from SARS, 685 deaths are attributable to
China. See SARS Deaths, supra note 39.
47. The determination of a public health emergency of international concern is made
based on the following four criteria: seriousness of the public health impact, unusual or
unexpected nature of the event, potential for the event to spread internationally and/or the
risk that restrictions to travel or trade may result because of the event. See IHR 2005,
supra note 10, at annex 2.
48. Id. at Part II, art. 6, 1.
49. The following diseases are "unusual and unexpected" and shall [emphasis
added] be reported to the WHO: smallpox, poliomyelitis due to wild-type poliovirus,
human influenza caused by a new subtype, and SARS. Id. at annex 2.
50. The following diseases may [emphasis added] require notification of the WHO:
cholera, pneumonic plague, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers, West Nile fever, and
"other diseases that are of special national or regional concern." See id.
2006]
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identified. This weakness resulted in inadequate notification 51 because
certain Member States were ill-equipped to effectively maintain contact
with the WHO during a public health crisis. 52 The proposed IHR require
Member States to establish a National IHR Focal Point5 3 and to designate
authorities who are responsible for implementing health measures under
the Regulations. The WHO will then appoint IHR Contact Points to
communicate with the National Focal Points on IHR matters.
54
Additionally, the IHR 2005 lay out the core capacities5 5 a Member State
must have at the local and national level to "detect, assess, notify and
report events"'56 to the WHO.
The IHR 2005 require the WHO to assist Member States in
implementing the Regulations.57 The WHO may grant Member States an
extension to fulfill the core capacities requirement.58 This collaborative
implementation framework ensures the participation of both the Member
States and the WHO in developing the most effective communication
scheme59 to deal with emerging diseases and emergency health threats.
The guidelines for reporting and communicating with the WHO also
provide Member States with a clear indication of their responsibilities.
4. Lack of Risk-Specific Measures
Under the IHR 1969, the WHO lacks the authority to prescribe
measures tailored to a specific disease outbreak. 60  By contrast, the
proposed IHR grant the WHO the power to issue both temporary and
51. See Stein, supra note 35, on the Chinese government's sluggishness in reporting
the SARS epidemic.
52. Member States range from industrialized nations such as the United States,
Canada, Japan and China, to more impoverished countries like Somalia, Afghanistan, and
Bangladesh. These latter countries likely lack the funding and resources necessary to
develop disease communication centers. See WHO Member States, supra note 11.
53. A National IHR Focal Point is the "national centre, designated by each State
Party, which shall be accessible at all times for communications with WHO IHR Contact
Points." IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part I, art. 1.
54. Id. at Part I, art. 4, 3.
55. Member States are required to have certain basic, or "core" capacities for disease
surveillance and response, and for treatment and assessment at points of entry. Only the
former types of core capacities are being referenced here. See id. at annex L.A for an
enumerated list of the core capacities a Member State must have for surveillance and
response. See infra Part V.A.2 for a discussion of the core capacities required at points
of entry.
56. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part II, art. 5, 1.
57. Id. at Part II, art. 5, 3.
58. Id. at Part 1I, art. 5, 2.
59. Contact details are required to be "continuously updated and annually
confirmed." Id. at Part I, art. 4, 4.
60. See HARDIMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 3.
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standing recommendations. 6' Although these recommendations are non-
binding,62 the WHO has the option to prescribe or modify the measures
required to minimize the spread of diseases. 63  Because the diseases
covered under the proposed IHR are not circumscribed,64 the WHO can
also customize its response to the concerns posed by a specific public
health event. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of these recommendations
depends heavily on refining communication 65 between the WHO and
Member States.
5. Nominal Compliance Incentives
Under the former IHR, there is a mandatory reporting requirement
for outbreaks of cholera, plague, and yellow fever.66 However, Member
States sometimes failed to report disease cases for fear that news of the
outbreak would impact international travel and trade.67 Thus, there was
little incentive for Member States to notify the WHO because economic
losses were practically certain once the WHO released information about
the public health event. Therefore, Member States were encouraged to
participate in the revision process because it permitted them to develop
rules and guidelines that they would be likely to follow.
In addition, the proposed IHR attempt to reduce interference with
trade68 by allowing Member States to make provisional confidential
notifications to the WHO.6 9 The WHO will not report a public health
event until it determines that the event is a public health emergency of
international concern, or until it confirms the contamination or spread of
the disease. 70 The WHO may also report the event if it believes control
measures are unlikely to succeed, are needed immediately, or if the
61. Temporary and standing recommendations are non-binding advice that the WHO
may issue to Member States. Temporary recommendations apply to a public health
emergency of international concern, but standing recommendations are more "routine or
periodic" in application. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part I art. 1.
62. Id.
63. Recommendations may be tailored to the following areas: persons, baggage,
cargo, containers, conveyances, goods and postal parcels. Id. at Part III, art. 18.
64. See supra Part III.A. I on the IHR .2005's disease coverage, which includes
existing, new and reemerging diseases.
65. See supra Part III.A.3 on the implementation of National Focal Points and IHR
Contact Points under the IHR 2005.
66. See IHR 1969, supra note 12, at Part I, art. 3, 1.
67. For example, during a 1994 outbreak of plague in India, the country lost an
estimated $1.7 billion in revenue. See HARDIMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 3.
68. One of the enumerated purposes of the proposed IHR is to "avoid unnecessary
interference with international traffic and trade." IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part I, art.
2.
69. See id. at Part II, art. 11.
70. Id. at Part II, art. 11, 2(a), (b).
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Member State lacks the capacity to contain the threat. 7' Although some
financial harm may inevitably occur, assessment-based reporting has an
obvious advantage over the former mandatory reporting system. The
WHO can now control the dissemination of information to other Member
States and to the public, thereby ensuring that economic losses remain at
a minimum.
Another incentive for compliance is intertwined with the WHO's
ability to promulgate disease-specific recommendations.72 In issuing,
modifying, or terminating recommendations, the WHO is required to
consider "the views of the State Parties directly concemed ' 7 3 in order to
temper international trade interference. This collaborative assessment
approach continues to promote the possibility of trade between Member
States even in the wake of a disease outbreak.
B. The Revision Process
The WHA resolved to revise the IHR in 1995. 74 The call for
revision was catalyzed by outbreaks of cholera in Peru, plague in India,
and Ebola in Zaire.75 In preparing to draft the new Regulations, the
WHA asked Member States for support in identifying and responding to
international public health emergencies, 76  including emergencies
involving biological or chemical agents.77 The WHA continued to foster
a collaborative relationship with Member States by passing a resolution
establishing intergovernmental working groups (IGWG). 78 The IGWG
allowed Member States to review draft revisions of the IHR and to
propose changes.
While the drafting of the IHR was ongoing, the immediate need for
71. Id. at Part II, art. 11, 2(c), (d).
72. See supra Part III.A.4 on the WHO's ability to issue temporary and standing
recommendations tailored to the necessities of a specific disease outbreak.
73. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part II, art. 17(a).
74. See World Health Assembly, Revision and Updating of the World Health
Regulations, WHA Res. 48.7, 48th Ass., 12th plen. mtg. (May 12, 1995).
75. Id.
76. See World Health Assembly, Global Health Security: Epidemic Alert and
Response, WHA Res. 54.14, 54th Ass., 9th plen. mtg. (May 21, 2001), available at
http://ftp.who.int/gb/pdf files/WHA54/ea54r14.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
77. See World Health Assembly, Global Public Health Response to Natural
Occurrence, Accidental Release, or Deliberate Use of Biological and Chemical Agents or
Radionuclear Material That Affect Health, WHA Res. 55.16, 55th Ass., 9th plen. mtg.
(May 18, 2002), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA55/
ewha5516.pdf (last visited Jan 10, 2006).
78. See World Health Assembly, Revision of the International Health Regulations,
WHA Res. 56.28, World Health Assembly, 56th Ass., 10th plen. mtg. (May 28, 2003),
available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf filesIWHA56/ea56r28.pdf (last visited
Jan. 10, 2007).
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uniform public health governance became clear due to two serious
international disease outbreaks: SARS and avian influenza. The WHA
intervened and issued resolutions asking Member States to commit to
controlling the SARS epidemic79 by increasing their pandemic influenza
preparedness and response.80  Finally, after revisions by the IGWG in
both 2004 and 2005, 8' the WHA adopted the IHR on May 23, 2005.82
IV. Legal Capacity, Sanctions and Interpretation
A. Legal Effect
The IHR would merely be a useless list of public health protocols if
it were not grounded in international law. Thus, within eighteen months
of the WHA's adoption of the IHR 2005 (by June 2007), a Member State
must accept the Regulations as legally binding or provide its reasons for
non-acceptance. 83 Non-Member states may also agree to be bound by
the Regulations.84 There are, however, limitations to a Member State's
non-acceptance. A Member State's reservation must not be incompatible
with the "object and purpose" of the IHR 2005.85 The WHA has the sole
discretion to determine whether a Member State has met this test and can
reject the Regulations.86
Still, the June 2007 adoption deadline for Member States did not
seem soon enough given the "ongoing outbreaks... of highly
pathogenic avian influenza" and the possibility of a pandemic.87 Thus, in
May 2006, the WHA called for immediate compliance, on a voluntary
basis, with the IHR 2005 provisions considered relevant to preventing an
avian and human influenza pandemic.88 Specifically, Member States
79. See World Health Assembly, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), WHA
Res. 56.29, 56th Ass., 10th plen. mtg. (May 28, 2003), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/ pdf files/WHA56/ea56r29.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
80. See World Health Assembly, Strengthening Pandemic-Influenza Preparedness
and Response, WHA Res. 58.5, 58th Ass., 8th plen. mtg. (May 23, 2005), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA58/WHA58_5-en.pdf (last visited Jan. 10,
2007).
81. See WHO FAQ, supra note 13.
82. For the resolution adopting the IHR 2005, see IHR 2005, supra note 10.
83. WHO CONST., supra note 23, at art. 20.
84. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part X, art. 64, 1.
85. Id. at Part X, art. 62, 1.
86. See id. at Part X, art. 62, 9.
87. See World Health Assembly, Application of the International Health Regulations
(2005), WHA Res. 59.2, 59th Ass., 8th plen. mtg. (May 26, 2006), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA59/WHA59_2-en.pdf (last visited Jan. 10,
2006). Of the 157 currently confirmed deaths from the A/(H5N1) strain of avian
influenza, 45 occurred in Indonesia in 2006. See Avian Influenza Deaths, supra note 30.
88. See id. The relevant provisions include the following:
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were asked to immediately establish National IHR Focal Points, and the
Director General was asked to designate IHR Contact Points. 9 Member
States were also requested to cooperate with one another to boost their
vaccination production capacity.90
B. Penalties and Dispute Resolution
Because the revision of the IHR was a collaborative effort that
involved both the WHO and Member States, compliance is ostensibly in
the best interest of all parties. Although there are no sanctions, per se,
for failure to adhere to the IHR 2005, the WHO is permitted to monitor
compliance with the Regulations. 91
The IHR 2005 offer several dispute mechanisms to settle
interpretation disagreements between two or more Member States,
including: arbitration, mediation, negotiation, and conciliation.92
Additionally, Member States may agree to refer the matter to the
Director-General. 93 In the event of a dispute between the WHO and one
or more Member States, the matter is submitted to the WHA.9 4 If the
dispute remains unresolved, it is then submitted to the International
Court of Justice.95
C. Interpretation
The IHR and other relevant international agreements "should be
(1) Annex 2, in so far as it requires prompt notification to WHO of human
influenza caused by a new virus subtype;
(2) Article 4 pertaining to the designation or establishment of a National IHR
Focal Point within countries and the designation of WHO IHR Contact Points,
and the definition of their functions and responsibilities;
(3) Articles in Part II, pertaining to surveillance, information-sharing,
consultation, verification and public health response;
(4) Articles 23 and 30-32 in Part V pertaining to general provisions for public
health measures for travellers on arrival or departure and special provisions for
travellers;
(5) Articles 45 and 46 in Part VIII pertaining to the treatment of personal data
and the transport and handling of biological substances, reagents and materials
for diagnostic purposes.
Id. at 2.
89. Id. at 4(1), 5(1).
90. Id. at 4(5).
91. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part X, art. 54, T$ 2, 3.
92. Id. at Part X, art. 56, 1.
93. Id. at Part X, art. 56, 2. Dr. Margaret Chan, who was appointed by the WHA
on November 9, 2006, is currently the Director-General of the WHO. See World Health
Organization, Director-General's Office, http://www.who.int/dg/en/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2006).
94. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part X, art. 56, 5.
95. WHO CONST., supra note 23, at art. 75.
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interpreted so as to be compatible" with one another.96 Member States
retain the sovereign right under international law and the Charter of the
U.N. to implement public health legislation, but that legislation must be
consistent with the purpose of the IHR. 97 Where appropriate, the WHO
is required to cooperate with intergovernmental organizations and
international bodies and may coordinate with such entities for the
protection of public health.98 Under the proposed IHR, the WHO will
therefore continue to foster working relationships with many
international organizations.99 In implementing the IHR, the WHO will
also work with specific regional organizations, such as the European
Union and the European Commission.1
00
V. Traveler Safeguards: Substantive Changes between the IHR 1969
and the IHR 2005
A. Health Measures
Global public health governance affects many aspects of human
rights,10' and in this context also presents opportunities for gross
abuse. 10 2 Health measures can be extremely intrusive, 103 invasive,' °4 or
96. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part X, art. 57, 1. For a roadmap of possible
interactions between the IHR 2005 and other international instruments, see World Health
Organization, Review and Approval of Proposed Amendments to the International Health
Regulations: Reservations to the International Health Regulations: Report by the
Secretariat (Jan. 27, 2005), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ghs/pdf/
IHRIGWG2_ID2-en.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
97. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part I, art. 3, 4.
98. Id. at Part II, art. 14, 1.
99. The WHO has standing agreements with the following organizations, the:
International Labour Organisation, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, International
Atomic Energy Agency, International Fund for Agricultural Development, United
Nations Industrial Development Organization, Universal Postal Union, International Air
Transport Association, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime
Organization, Office International d'Epizooties (World Organisation for Animal Health)
and World Trade Organization. See generally WHO CONST., supra note 23.
100. WHO FAQ, supra note 13.
101. See New Conception, supra note 6, at 423.
102. Singapore's measures in containing the SARS epidemic were described by one
journalist as "draconian." The country placed Intenet cameras in the homes of
quarantined patients, made some patients wear electronic monitoring bracelets, and
installed thermal-imaging scanners to take passengers' temperatures in airports. See
Richard C. Paddock, A Hotbed of SARS Warfare: Mass Temperature Testing is Just One
of the Tools that the Autocratic City-State of Singapore is Wielding in Winning its Assault
on the Disease, L.A. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at 1.
103. The IHR 2005 define 'intrusive' as "possibly provoking discomfort through
close or intimate contact or questioning." IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part I, art. 1.
104. Invasive "means the puncture or incision of the skin or insertion of an instrument
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humiliating' °5 to an individual. These measures also risk being applied
in a discriminatory fashion, 06 or in an excessive manner. Thus, clear
boundaries need to be drawn between treatment measures that are
permissible during a public health event, and those that violate
international law.
10 7
1. Purpose and Basic Principles
The IHR 1969 concisely state their mission as "maximum
protection, minimal restriction," which refers to trade boundaries, not
human rights. 108 The proposed IHR boast that their purpose is to
"respond to the international spread of disease" by methods "restricted to
public health risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference with
international travel and trade."' 09 There is no mention of minimizing
interference with individual liberty in either of the Regulations' mission
statements. Instead, the concern rests entirely on limiting the economic
consequences of disease control. Such an oversight indicates that the
priority of the revised IHR lies in sustaining commerce, not in protecting
human rights.
Oversimplified statements of human rights protections continue to
appear throughout the IHR 2005. Following the statement of purpose,
the IHR 2005 vaguely refers to implementing the Regulations "with full
respect for the dignity, human rights, and fundamental freedoms of
persons.""10 In Part VIII, the IHR 2005 state that health measures "shall
be initiated and completed without delay" in a "non-discriminatory
manner."' 1 Article 32 expounds somewhat on the meaning of "non-
discriminatory,"" 12 but provides no suggestion of what type of behavior
or foreign material into the body or the examination of the body cavity." Temperature-
taking by any method other than rectally, and collection of urine, feces, or saliva samples
are specifically listed as measures that are non-invasive. Id.
105. The old IHR provided that a traveler who has come from an area infected with
cholera, or who presents symptoms of cholera, does not have to submit to rectal
swabbing, but "may be required to submit to a stool examination." IHR 1969, supra note
12, at Part V, art. 64.
106. Gender, sociocultural, ethnic and religious concerns of travelers shall be
considered in implementing health measures. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part V, art.
32(b).
107. The IHR 1969 were adopted before the development of international human
rights law, so the current IHR do not protect human rights under international law.
However, the IHR 2005 are subject to interpretation under international law. See id. at
Part X, art. 57, 1.
108. IHR 1969, supra note 12, at foreword.
109. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part I, art. 2.
110. Id. at Part 1, art. 3, 1.
111. Id. at Part VIII art. 42. The IHR 1969 make a similar statement. See IHR 1969,
supra note 12, at Part IV, art. 24.
112. See IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part V, art. 32(b).
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is explicitly prohibited. In sum, the human rights principles and
objectives stated in the IHR 2005 remain too generalized to provide
travelers with satisfactory assurances of protection against governmental
intrusion.
11 3
In addition to their failure to enumerate human rights principles, it
has also been suggested that the IHR 2005's mission statement does not
conform to the realities of effective disease control.1 14 Globalization has
generated economic prosperity, but it also has encouraged the
expeditious spread of disease.1 15  In fact, the objective of the WHO
Constitution 16 does not even mention commerce or trade, and therefore
starkly contradicts the IHR's mission statement. 
1
17
2. Core Capacities Requirements: Points of Entry'1
In contrast to the elusive human rights principles that are weakly set
forth in the proposed IHR, the basic requirements' 19 for controlling
disease at points of entry are more specifically enumerated. 120 Many of
these mandates implicitly acknowledge human rights concerns by
requiring sufficient treatment availability and conditions.12 ' The IHR
2005 contain a full-page description of the minimum treatment
requirements Member States' points of entry must have not only in
general, but also in responding to a public health emergency of
international concern. 122 This is a vast improvement over the old IHR
treatment requirements. Medical equipment, staff and facilities under the
IHR 1969 were simply mandated to be "adequate."'
23
The IHR 2005 provide that at all times, points of entry shall provide
access to "appropriate medical service," which includes adequate
diagnostic facilities, equipment, and staff.124  If the facility cannot
113. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, International Infectious Disease Law: Revision of the
World Health Organization's International Health Regulations, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
2623, 2626 (2004) [hereinafter Infectious Disease Law].
114. Gostin contends that it is impossible to have "unimpeded travel and trade" while
ensuring "full public health protection." Id. at 2624.
115. See, e.g., Steps to Combat Emerging Diseases, supra note 36.
116. See WHO CONST., supra note 23, at art. 1.
117. See Infectious Disease Law, supra note 113, at 2624.
118. Points of entry are places like airports and ports. They are defined as passages
"for international entry or exit of travelers ... as well as agencies and areas providing
services to them on entry or exit." IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part I, art. 1.
119. The term "basic requirements" is used here to refer to the statement that Member




123. IHR 1969, supra note 12, at Part II1, arts. 15, 1812.
124. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at annex 1.B, 1 (a).
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sufficiently handle a sick traveler's condition, it must transport the
patient to an alternative, fully equipped medical facility. 25 Travelers are
also guaranteed a "safe environment" 126 at points of entry.
The core capacities required at points of entry for a public health
emergency of international concern are more stringent than the basic
requirements. First, Member States must establish and maintain a
"public health emergency contingency plan," which names agencies,
coordinators and contact points for managing the emergency. 27 Medical
and veterinary facilities must make arrangements to render services to
sick travelers and animals. 28 Points of entry must leave appropriate
space for conducting interviews1 29 and quarantining 130 travelers. Similar
to the basic requirements, trained personnel and appropriate medical
equipment must be on-hand.'13
The core capacities requirements dispel the ambiguities of the
former IHR by defining exactly what resources are needed for disease
containment and treatment at points of entry. Although this may seem to
leave little flexibility in how Member States can implement the
requirements, the history of the IHR 1969 demonstrates that explicit
guidelines are better than leaving open-ended decision-making to
Member States. 32 As an added safeguard, Member States are required to
monitor and inspect the basic requirements to ensure compliance and to
determine if additional provisions are necessary to maintain a safe
environment. 1
33
3. Temporary and Standing Recommendations
Under the former IHR, the WHO was not empowered to make
disease-specific recommendations; 134 however, the proposed IHR allows
the WHO to issue temporary and standing recommendations. 35 These
recommendations may be disseminated periodically or during a public
125. Id. at annex l.B, 1(b).
126. Points of entry must furnish "potable water supplies, eating establishments, flight
catering facilities, public washrooms, and appropriate and solid liquid waste disposal
services." Id. at annex 1.B, 1(d).
127. Id. at annex 1.B, 2(a).
128. See id. at annex 1.B, 2(b).
129. See id. at annex 1.B, 2(c).
130. The WHO prefers that quarantine be provided at a facility away from the point
of entry. See id. at annex 1.B, 2(d).
131. See id. at annex 1.B, 2(g).
132. For example, see supra Parts III.A.2,3 on the collaboration and notification
problems under the IHR 1969.
133. See IHR 2005, supra note 10, at annex 1.B, 1 (d).
134. See supra Part III.A.4 on the lack of risk-specific measures in the IHR 1969.
135. See supra note 61 on the difference between temporary and standing
recommendations.
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health emergency of international concern. 36 Like the core capacities,
the WHO's disease control recommendations also implicate human
rights. Article 17 declares that these recommendations must not be
"more intrusive to persons than reasonably available alternatives that
would achieve the appropriate level of health protection."1 37 Article 18
enumerates the type of recommendations that may be issued,1 38 and thus
gives some clarification to Article 17's vague reference to what
constitutes "other reasonable available alternatives."
The IHR 2005's balancing test between the proposed
recommendation and other reasonably available alternatives is an
improvement over the old IHR, which only applied health measures so as
"not to cause undue discomfort to any person, or injury to his health." 39
Still, the list of temporary and standing recommendations is not
exclusive.1 40  This gives the WHO significant breadth to issue
recommendations adapted to a particular situation. However, the
possibility that this flexibility will invite abuse is tempered by providing
specific criteria that the Director-General is required to consider before
issuing recommendations.1 4' Relevant international law, advice of
committees and of Member States, and scientific evidence and
information are all factors that the Director-General must assess. 141
It is also important to note that both temporary and standing
recommendations serve as the WHO's non-binding advice 143 to Member
States. Member States' failure to follow these recommendations does
136. See IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part III, arts. 15, 16.
137. Id. at Part III, art. 17, I(d).
138. Recommendations that the WHO may issue to State Parties with respect to
persons may include any of the following advice:
-No specific health measures are advised;
-Review travel history in affected areas;
-Review proof of medical examination and any laboratory analysis;
-Require medical examinations;
-Require vaccinations or other prophylaxis;
-Place suspect persons under public health observation;
-Implement quarantine or other health measures for suspect persons;
-Implement isolation and treatment when necessary of affected persons;
-Implement tracing of contracts of suspect or affected persons;
-Refuse entry of suspect and affected persons;
-Refuse entry of unaffected persons to affected areas; and
-Implement exit screening and/or restrictions on persons from affected areas.
Id. at art. 18, 1.
139. IHR 1969, supra note 12, at Part IV, art. 25, 1 (a).
140. The language "recommendations... may include" suggests that the WHO can
issue temporary or standing recommendations that are not listed in Article 18. See IHR
2005, supra note 10, at Part III, art. 18.
141. See id. at Part III, art. 17.
142. Id.
143. See id. at Part I, art. 1.
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not permit the WHO to bring an enforcement action. 144 Therefore, the
IHR 2005 allow Member States to issue their own health measures as
long as they achieve "the same or greater level of health protection than
WHO recommendations," or as long as they are not otherwise prohibited
by the Regulations.1 45 Member States are required to craft their health
measures using criteria similar to those considered by the Director-
General.1 46 The consideration requirements of both the Director-General
and the Member States control abuse by ensuring health measures are
well-researched before being implemented.
In sum, the recommendation issuance procedures established by the
IHR 2005 greatly minimize the opportunities for human rights abuses
because of the checks and balances between the WHO and Member
States. The WHO researches the recommendations, but Member States
can still reject them without legal penalty, and Member States are always
free to implement their own measures within the IHR 2005's guidelines.
The system, though, is only as dependable as the entities involved, and if
the recommendations are not well-regulated or well-monitored, traveler
safeguards still risk being ignored.
4. Vaccinations and Examinations
Traditional democratic notions of bodily integrity 47 demand the
enforcement of stringent guidelines before an international traveler can
be poked and prodded against his will. Under the IHR 2005, a traveler
cannot be vaccinated or examined without his informed consent or the
informed consent of his guardian.148 However, if a traveler fails to
consent to a health measure, he may be denied entry; if there is evidence
of a health risk, he may be compelled to be vaccinated or examined. 149
Similar to the temporary and standing recommendations, the examination
must be the least intrusive means to achieve the public health
objective.' 50 Vaccinations that involve a risk of disease transmission
must be administered "in accordance with established national or
international safety guidelines.'
151
144. See supra Part IV.B on penalties and dispute resolution under the IHR 2005.
145. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part VIII, art. 43, 1.
146. Member States' determinations of what health measures to implement shall be
based upon scientific principles, available scientific evidence of a risk to human health,
and any available guidance or advice from the WHO. Id. at Part VIII, art. 43, 2.
147. The American legal system prosecutes an intentional harmful or offensive
touching as a battery. See, e.g., Snyder v. Turk, 627 N.E.2d 1053, 1057 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993).
148. See IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part V, art. 23, 3.
149. Seeid. atPartV, art. 31, 2.
150. Id. at Part V, art. 31, 2(a).
151. Id. at Part V, art. 23, 4.
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By contrast, the IHR 1969 do not require informed consent before
health authorities may vaccinate or examine a traveler. Under the IHR
1969, when health authorities deem it necessary, they are permitted to
examine any person arriving on an international voyage,' 52 and any
person departing on an international voyage.1 53  Any traveler who
exhibits symptoms of cholera within the incubation period may be
required to submit to a stool examination. 54  "Vaccination against
yellow fever may be required of any traveler leaving an infected area on
an international voyage,"'' 55 but inoculation against plague is not a
condition of admission. 56 Some of these requirements are obsolete, but
they illustrate the vast leeway afforded to health authorities under the
IHR 1969 compared to the informed consent restrictions of the IHR
2005.
5. Isolation and Quarantine'
57
Isolation and quarantine are two of the oldest public health tools
used to contain infectious diseases. 158  The terms "isolation" and
"quarantine" are often used interchangeably, but they refer to two
different health measures. Isolation is the separation of a known infected
person.'59 Quarantine is the restriction of activities or the separation of a
healthy person who has been exposed to an infectious disease., 60 In both
instances, the goal is to limit the spread or the possible spread of
infection or contamination. 161
The IHR 2005 briefly address the treatment of travelers who are
subject to isolation or quarantine. 62 Travelers must be provided with
adequate food, water, clothing, protection for baggage, and medical
treatment.163  One cause for concern is that Member States are onlyrequired to provide a means of communication for quarantined or
152. SeeIHR 1969, supra note 12, at Part IV, art. 36, 1.
153. See id. at Part IV, art. 30, 3.
154. Id. at Part V, art. 64, 2.
155. Id. at Part V, art. 66, 1.
156. Id. at Part V, art. 51.
157. Although here the terms are referred to only as impacting human beings,
isolation and quarantine may also be applied to infected or suspect goods. For a
discussion of the treatment of personal items under the IHR 2005, see infra Part V.C.
158. Lawrence 0. Gostin, Ethical and Legal Challenges Posed by Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome: Implications for the Control of Severe Infectious Disease Threats,
290 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 3229, 3230 (2003) [hereinafter SARS Implications].
159. See IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part 1, art. 1.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at Part V, art. 32(c).
163. Id.
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isolated travelers who do not speak the native language "if possible."'164
This is inconsistent with the mandate requiring Member States to account
for "gender, sociocultural, ethnic or religious concerns of travelers"'
165
because these concerns cannot be voiced when there is a communication
barrier. Conversely, the IHR 1969 do not specify the particulars of
isolation and quarantine beyond the fact that Member States have the
power to implement these health measures when necessary.
66
It is ironic that the IHR 2005 devote only a paragraph to addressing
isolation and quarantine safeguards despite the fact that these measures
involve physical confinement, which is a significant encroachment on
individual liberty. 167  Recognizing Member States' need for more
detailed guidance, one scholar proposes integrating substantive and
procedural safeguards to guarantee that containment measures are
implemented with due regard for human rights. 68 Such an incorporation
would take the arbitrariness out of containment measures and ensure that
only those who are truly infected or at risk would be subject to isolation
or quarantine.
B. Personal Data
When personal data is involved, there are two main issues that
implicate the conflict between individual liberty and public health
governance. One issue involves privacy concerns over the collection and
dissemination of health information. 69 The other issue entails the type
of health information that international travelers should be required to
provide before being admitted into a country.
The IHR 2005 devote an entire article to the treatment of personal
data. 70  Health information collected or received by a Member State
from another Member State or from the WHO "which refers to an
identified or identifiable person shall be kept confidential and processed
164. Id.
165. Id. at Part V, art. 32(b).
166. See IHR 1969, supra note 12, at Part IV, art. 23.
167. During the SARS outbreak, Singapore hired a security agency to enforce
quarantine. The agency used electronic bracelets and Internet cameras to supervise
quarantined patients. See Paddock, supra note 102.
168. Lawrence 0. Gostin comments that the revised IHR "are silent regarding the
legal standards and fair processes necessary for isolation, quarantine, and other
compulsory measures." Infectious Disease Law, supra note 113, at 2626.
169. Disclosure of sensitive health information can ruin a person's career or even his
life. A prominent example is the disclosure of the late Arthur Ashe's HIV-positive status.
See Technology is Changing Health Data Security Landscape, HEALTH DATA MGMT.,
Sept. 18, 1997.
170. See IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part VIII, art. 45.
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anonymously as required by law."'17  However, Member States may
disclose personal data "where essential for the purposes of assessing and
managing a public health risk,"'' 72 but the disclosure is subject to certain
qualifications. 73 The WHO is also required to furnish a traveler with his
personal data if he requests it.' 74 In contrast, the IHR 1969 make no
mention of any confidentiality or privacy guidelines regarding the
treatment of personal information.
The IHR 1969 and the IHR 2005 both provide that an international
traveler shall not be required to produce any health documents beyond
those required by the Regulations. 75  The IHR 2005 qualify that no
traveler possessing a valid certificate of vaccination shall be denied entry
unless there is "verifiable" evidence that the vaccine was ineffective.
6
In addition, the IHR 2005 provide an updated Model International
Certificate of Vaccination or Prophylaxis with criteria listed for
establishing the validity of the certificate. 77  However, inoculation
against yellow fever is the only vaccination that may be required as a
condition of entry, 78 and it is only required if the traveler leaves an area
where the risk of yellow fever transmission is present. 179 Member States
must designate yellow fever vaccination centers for travelers,' 80 and they
have the option to quarantine those travelers who are without a valid
171. Id. at Part VIII, art. 45, 1.
172. Id. at Part VIII, art. 45, 2.
173. The Member State and/or the WHO must ensure that the personal data are:
(a) Processed fairly and lawfully, and not further processed in a way
incompatible with that purpose;
(b) Adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to that purpose;
(c) Accurate, and where necessary, kept up to date; every reasonable step must
be taken to ensure that data which are inaccurate or incomplete are erased or
rectified; and
(d) Not kept longer than necessary.
Id.
174. This information must be provided "without undue delay or expense." Id. at Part
VIII, art. 45, 3.
175. IHR 1969, supranote 12, atPartVl, art. 81;Id. atPart VI, art. 35.
176. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part VI, art. 36, 2.
177. There are minor changes between the Model International Certificate of
Vaccination or Prophylaxis in the IHR 1969 and the IHR 2005, but they are not
noteworthy. Both Regulations state that the vaccine must have been approved by the
WHO, the certificate must be signed by an authorized medical practitioner or health
worker, and the certificate must bear the official stamp of the administering center. IHR
1969, supra note 12, at app. 2; id. at annex 6.
178. Although there may be recommendations that travelers receive other
vaccinations, or the requirements could be subject to change during a public health event,
yellow fever is the only disease for which vaccination may be required as a condition of
entry. See IHR 2005, supra note 10, at annex 7, 1.
179. See id. at annex 7, 2(b).
180. See id. at annex 7, 2(f).
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vaccination certificate and who pose a risk of transmission.' 81
Overall, the IHR 2005's guidelines for maintaining personal data
are a vast improvement over those of the IHR 1969. Information
technology poses a high threat of disclosure that was not present when
the Regulations were first adopted, which is why it is imperative that the
IHR 2005 recognize this change and implement safeguards to deal with
emerging technological threats like computer hacking. Also, while the
IHR 2005 do not expand on the type of documentation needed for
entering a country, they do give a better overview on how Member States
can and should regulate vaccination requirements. This dispels the
possibility of international travelers encountering capricious vaccination
requirements.
C. Personal Items
The IHR 2005 permit Member States to inspect "baggage cargo,
containers, conveyances, goods, postal parcels and human remains" for
public health purposes on arrival or departure. 82 In addition to issuing
temporary and standing recommendations for travelers, the WHO is
empowered to issue these recommendations for baggage and other
cargo.183 Recommendations may include a review of measures taken on
departure to eliminate contamination, implementation of isolation and
quarantine, and, at the most extreme, seizure and destruction of infected
or suspect items.184  To minimize the damage associated with these
health measures, Member States must provide or arrange for the
"protection of baggage and other possessions.', 85
The main difference between the IHR 1969 and the IHR 2005
regarding baggage procedures relates to the temporary and standing
recommendations, which do not appear in the former IHR. Other than
this, the IHR 1969 provide that "every precaution shall be taken to avoid
any damage" to cargo, goods, baggage, containers and other articles.186
They also vaguely state that baggage is subject to any of the health
measures in the Regulations when it comes from an infected area or
when contamination is suspected.
87
Even though baggage is personal and may be particularly important
181. See id. at annex 7, 2(h).
182. Id. at Part V, art. 23, l(b).
183. See id. at Part III, art. 18, 2.
184. This list of recommendations with regard to baggage, cargo, containers,
conveyances, goods or postal parcels is not exhaustive. For a more detailed list of
potential recommendations, see id. at Part III, art. 18, 2.
185. Id. at Part V, art. 32(c).
186. IHR 1969, supra note 12, at Part IV, art. 25, 2.
187. See id. at Part IV, art. 46, 1.
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to travelers, its preservation should never take priority over public health.
The IHR 2005 recognize this practical limitation by preserving the IHR
1969's health measures with respect to baggage, which include fostering
mechanisms that allow for the protection of baggage when feasible. This
compromise acknowledges the importance of personal possessions while
continuing to further the IHR's purpose of ensuring maximum public
health protection.
D. Charges
Health measures concerning persons, data, and baggage can be
expensive, so a question arises as to who should be required to absorb
these costs. Medical examinations, vaccinations on arrival, isolation and
quarantine, vaccination certificates, and any health measure applied to
baggage are provided to the traveler free of charge under the IHR
2005.1"' Member States may charge for any services other than the
above mentioned, including those "primarily for the benefit of the
traveler,"1 89 but the charge is not permitted to exceed the actual cost of
the service rendered. 90 A traveler is never denied the ability to depart
pending payment, 191 and charges are levied "without distinction as to
nationality, domicile, or residence of the traveler."
1 92
Only vaccinations and medical examinations are provided to
travelers free of charge under the LHR 1969.193 However, the IHR 2005
retain the identical language as the IHR 1969 regarding non-
discriminatory application of charges. 194 Similarly, charges under the
IHR 1969 are not permitted to exceed the actual cost of the service
rendered.1 95 Unlike the IHR 2005, however, there are no provisions in
the IHR 1969 regarding a traveler's failure or inability to pay.
Even with the expanded free services under the IHR 2005, it has
been suggested that travelers, especially those subject to isolation or
quarantine, deserve compensation for any income lost during the
duration of these health measures. 196  The rationale behind a
remuneration scheme is that the community should bear the financial
burden when individual liberty is compromised in favor of public
188. See IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part VII, art. 40, 1.
189. Id. at Part VII, art. 40, 2.
190. See id. at Part VII, arts. 40, 3kb); 41, 1(b).
191. See id. at Part VII art. 40, 6.
192. Id. at Part VII arts. 40, 3(c); 41, 1 (c).
193. See IHR 1969, supra note 12, at Part VII, art. 82, 1.
194. See id. at Part VII, art. 82, 2(c).
195. See id. at Part VII, art. 82, 2(b).
196. "Fairness may require compensation, particularly for the poor who lose vital
income during isolation or quarantine." SARS Implications, supra note 158, at 3234.
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health.' 97 In spite of this logic, determining compensation is probably
too speculative to be appropriately quantified, and too susceptible to
abuse without explicit compensation limits. Even then, the better
rationale may be to put funding toward disease containment rather than
traveler compensation, with the hope of decreasing casualties and
improving the effectiveness of isolation and quarantine measures.
VI. Conclusion
International travel is an important facet of a globalized society, and
the IHR 2005 are just one of the mechanisms that seek to protect those
who must venture beyond national boundaries. As public health scholar
Lawrence 0. Gostin notes, "[w]ithout a certain level of health, safety and
security.., people cannot... meaningfully exercise their autonomy or
participate in social or political life." 198 The goal, then, is to harmonize
individual liberty with the needs of public health law, and not to usurp
individual liberty under the auspices of protecting the social order. In
other words, it is crucial not to forget the "public" in public health law.
One recurring suggestion for improving the balance between human
rights and public health necessity is for the IHR 2005 to incorporate the
Siracusa Principles.1 99  These principles are "well accepted by the
international community." 200 They acknowledge that "[d]erogation from
rights recognized under international law in order to respond to a threat
to the life of the nation is not exercised in a legal vacuum. It is
authorized by law and as such it is subject to several legal principles of
general application., 20 1 As such, U.N. Member States20 2 and even non-
Member States are prohibited from violating certain fundamental human
203rights, even in times of public emergency.
If the IHR 2005 incorporated the Siracusa Principles, these
principles would give greater meaning to Article 3's goal of
implementing the Regulations "with full respect for the ... human rights
of persons. 20 4  Fundamental human rights would be explicitly
enumerated, with little or no room for controversy over whether a health
measure violates these rights. Incorporation of the Siracusa Principles
197. See id.
198. Lawrence 0. Gostin, World Health Law: The Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act: Public Health and Civil Liberties in a Time of Terrorism, 13 HEALTH
MATRIX 3, 32 (2003).
199. See generally Siracusa Principles, supra note 4.
200. Infectious Disease Law, supra note 113, at 2626.
201. Siracusa Principles, supra note 4, at Part II.D, 61.
202. For a list of the 192 U.N. Member States, see United Nations, List of Member
States, http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2006).
203. See Siracusa Principles, supra note 4, at Part I.D, 58.
204. IHR 2005, supra note 10, at Part I, art. 3, 1.
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would also shift the IHR's heavy focus on minimalizing trade
interference by putting more emphasis on the human element of public
health law.
Moreover, several public health experts perceive safeguarding
human rights as critical to implementing effective global public health
governance. 20 5 Essentially, the theory is that "the best way to promote
and protect public health is to promote and protect human rights. 20 6
This concept is not outlandish because garnering public trust and
cooperation and promoting education are consistently endorsed as
207methods of improving public health governance. However, unilateral
efforts by public health authorities to promote human rights are only part
of the solution. Individuals also need to take responsibility for educating
themselves on international health law and their basic human rights
under these laws.2 °8
205. See, e.g., FIDLER, supra note 7, at 170.
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Barry S. Levy, M.D., Twenty-First Century Challenges for Law and
Public Health, 32 IND. L. REV. 1140. Levy opines that effective public health governance
necessitates listening to people in the community, educating the community, and
advocating for healthy conditions and "the basic human rights on which they are based."
Id. at 1158-59.
208. A good general starting point for keeping up-to-date on public health events is
the website of the World Health Organization. See World Health Organization Home
Page, http://www.who.int/en/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2007).
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